# Understanding the Structure of Institutions Responsible for the Delivery for Sustainable Urban Transport

## DISTILLATE: Formal Deliverable D2

## Final DRAFT

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# DISTILLATE Project D Structures Report

## 1. Introduction

The DISTILLATE ("Design and Implementation Support Tools for Integrated Local Land use, Transport and the Environment") programme of research is one of 14 research programmes funded under the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council's (EPSRC) overarching research programme on the development of a Sustainable Urban Environment (SUE).

This Report starts with a section locating it in the wider DISTILLATE Project, the specific sub-project within the DISTILLATE consortium within which it sits, and the wider social science and, to a limited degree, within transport policy literature. This is followed by a section (Section 2) which explores in some more depth the theoretical bases which have informed our thinking. It is important to note that we are using a 'grounded' approach: thus, our targeted literature and information review proper happens after this initial report on our data and cases.

Section 3 takes our case study data and, in the light of section 2, imposes a 'light' organization upon it. This analysis is deepened at the end of Section 3 (3.5) where the data is related back to out project objectives which are listed in Section 1. The *working* conclusion is in a final section. It is also important to note that this report is part of the first tranche of output for Project D and, as a result of the approach we have taken points only to out initial analysis which will be refined through out information and literature review and our continuing cases.

### 1.1. Where this Report fits within DISTILLATE

The vision of DISTILLATE is of a step change in the way in which sustainable urban transport and land use strategies are developed and delivered. We are trying to achieve this through a focused programme of research in the UK context, in such a way that the more generally applicable tools and approaches can be widely disseminated. Given this vision, the principal objective of DISTILLATE is to develop, through a focused, inter-disciplinary research programme, ways of overcoming barriers to the effective development and delivery of sustainable urban transport and land use strategies. The scope of DISTILLATE has been defined to include all passenger transport policy interventions, both large and small, which have a significant impact on sustainability, as well as those land use interventions which have a significant impact on transport. While focusing on urban areas, we will also be considering their regional context.

Within DISTILLATE we have specified the following seven sub-objectives:

1. to document and review the barriers to the delivery of sustainable strategies;

2. to develop new methods for generating appropriate strategy and scheme options and for designing integrated strategies;

3. to establish an effective set of core indicators and targets as an input to strategy formulation, forecasting and appraisal;

4. to support the more effective collaboration between the agencies, organisations and individuals responsible for transport strategy development, both internal and external to local authorities;

5. to develop approaches for overcoming the financial and other barriers to effective implementation;

6. to enhance existing predictive models to reflect the impact of the wider range of policy instruments, and to facilitate interactive strategy development; and

7. to improve the methods used for appraisal to reflect more effectively the requirements of sustainability.

This Report, FD2, along with FD1, forms part of the first formal deliverable designed to help us meet the fourth of these objectives: improved effectiveness in organisational delivery.

## 1.2. Where this Report fits within DISTILLATE Project D

These two early, formal deliverables from DISTILLATE Project D, taken together and following on from the *Project D Logical Framework Analysis* (which can be found on the DISTILLATE website at www.distillate.ac.uk), are the *Processes Report* (FD1) and the *Structures Report* (FD2). The two form an interlinked whole in a symbiotic way.

The distinction between process and structure is illustrated in Figure 1 below. This report, FD2, reports primarily on the system itself and also on **how people think** of the system. These latter are ingrained beliefs and – as such – may not be susceptible to quick and easy change but any ways that can be found of changing them should be effective and long lasting. Thus, we hope to be able to bring about a 'step change' in people's actions by influencing how they think about things. Further, we can easily observe processes and physical structures ('attributes A' in Fig 1) but we can only infer people's *Norms* or the rules which guide their behaviour. The distinction between what is structural and what is processural is clear enough, but it is important to note this duality within our usage of the term structure.

In the DISTILLATE *Inception Report* (DISTILLATE 2004: 22) we said that in Project D we would gather information on:

- the values of key actors,

- the assumptions they hold,

- their organisational responsibilities,

- the range of resources available to them,

- actors' interpretations of formal and informal 'rules',

and

- internal mechanisms and practices.

In order to approach these issues in a coherent and logical way we have ascribed each of these important factors which contribute to the success of organisational delivery to one or other, or both, of the reports. As the interlinkedness of these factors is multifaceted, it is not possible – or indeed desirable – to make two mutually exclusive lists. However, in FD1 DISTILLATE researchers – led by UWE – reflect upon the processes that ensue from the structures outlined here. The following ascription has been used to draw an analytical distinction between what people actually do, what we call here 'processes' and structure (see Table 1 opposite). Thus, we can conceive of these two reports as dealing with the actions themselves (the *Processes Report*, FD1) and all the things, material and non-material, which constrain process, this 'Structures' Report, FD2. It also becomes obvious that, from an academic point of view, FD1 is nested inside the more analytical FD2.

## Structure

### attributes A
**Physical things:**
- Buildings
- Offices
- Institutions
  - Government structure

### attributes B
**Non-material things - i.e. things which act as if they have a physical reality:**
- Political systems
- Disciplinary differences
- Perceptions of and actual responsibilities

*Non-material things also constrain actions*

## Process 'actions'

**Doing things**
- Meetings
- Working practices

*Physical things constrain actions*

Figure 1: What is Structure and what is Process and the (iterative) relationship between the two

| Processes report FD1 | Structures Report FD2 |
|---|---|
| | • the values of key actors |
| | • the assumptions key actors hold |
| | • key actors' organisational responsibilities |
| • the range of resources available to key actors:<br>  o finance<br>  o use of time<br>  o political process<br>  o staff<br>  o knowledge & skills<br><br>(NB these latter two also influenced by structural attributes) | • the range of resources available to key actors:<br>  o finance<br>  o structural allocation of time<br>  o political context (including political cycles)<br>  o access to the 'action arena' (i.e. Knowledge and Power) |
| • actors' interpretations of formal and informal 'rules' (at the micro-level, a.k.a. rules for individual behaviour) | • actors' interpretations of formal and informal 'rules' (at the macro-level, a.k.a. rules for institutional and organisational behaviour) |
| • internal mechanisms and practices | |

Table 1: The relationship between process & structure and the issues influencing organisational delivery

Both the physical structure ('attributes A') and the non-material structure ('attributes B') influence the behaviour and actions of individual actors and how they function. This is shown in Figure 1 above. The physical things constrain actions – *e.g.* if you have co-workers at different sites it may militate against informal relationships (but it may, conversely, mean that more effort is put into formal relationships than co-workers who share adjacent office locations). It is important to note that we are not saying that institutions and government structure are physical things alone: we are saying that they are both physical and non-material. Thus, there is a constant overlap in reality, e.g. actions are constantly mediated by structure (meeting rooms, tools, maps, diagrams, reports) and vice versa.

In the DISTILLATE Inception Report (p22) we stated that we will "developing further our knowledge on how internal organisational and inter-organisational mechanisms shape how actors decide upon strategies" by using: "management and other social science theories and applying them to real-case situations from our partners". The five issues that we have been trying to elucidate tends to fall into two sections along the lines of the Structure A and Structure B as per fig.1.

Structure A: The system itself provides

- actors' organisational (official) responsibilities and

- the range of resources available to them to carry out these tasks

while Structure B, what goes on in their heads, adds:

- the values of key actors,

- the assumptions they hold, and

- actors' interpretations of formal and informal 'rules'.

It cannot be emphasised enough the importance of the latter set of attributes of the social system. As Downing e*t al* put it, "The actions of actors are constrained by their attributes, the inherent characteristics of individuals and groups" and thus the importance of understanding the *explanatory* model of the social structure in understanding what constrains actions is shown in the following excerpt:

> Explanation of the rules or principles whereby actual choices are made requires not only the identification of the goals which actors try to attain through their activities but also the enumeration of all the limiting factors which they have to take into consideration in their decisions on the course of actions, and the specifications of the ways in which they interplay. An explanatory model of social relations and alignments built in these premises is much more complex than that normative model which is simply constructed through the enumeration of jural rules. Its elements are, on the one hand, the various norms to which the actors subscribe and, on the other hand, their goals. Unlike in the normative model of **social structure**, it is the latter and not the former which are seen as the basic motivational mechanisms. The explanatory model constructed to elucidate the pattern of individual choices of which any observed statistical distribution is the outcome treats the statistical structure as a descriptive device and the normative structure as the relevant stock of actors' knowledge manipulated by them in the process of decision making. As far as this normative structure is concerned, **what is treated as problematic is not this structure itself, but rather** whether why, and how it does or does not enter into individual decisions, or, in other words, **what people do with it in the process of shaping their interactions** [in order to attain their goals]. (Holy & Stucklik: 1983, emphasis added).

The importance of understanding the social structure (Structure attributes B) is that, without this understanding, you cannot understand when actors are 'operating within the rules' and when they are 'modifying rules' or even 'establishing new rules'! Schlager & Blomquist (1996) tell us that actors can do all three but that "actions of the latter type represent institutional change, as contrasted to

action within institutional constraints". The successes for Project D will normally be where individual actors have either used, manipulated, or changed the system (Structure and Structure attributes) in order to meet their goals.

Importantly, non-material things – how people perceive 'the system' – also constrain actions. Individual actor's perceptions of their, or others', roles and responsibilities as well as what is perceived as politically acceptable are constantly constraining the actor's idea of what is the 'correct' course of action. This is sometimes referred to as 'bounded rationality' (this term will be returned to below).

The relationship between the two structural attributes (A and B) of Figures 1 and the content of what follows in this Report (cf. Table 1) is as follows:

| Structures Report FD2 | Structural attribute |
|---|---|
| • the values of key actors | • B |
| • the assumptions key actors hold | • B |
| • key actors' organisational responsibilities | • A and B |
| • the range of resources available to key actors: | |
|     o finance | • A but influenced by Values which are B |
|     o structural allocation of time | • A but influenced by Values which are B |
|     o political context (including political cycles) | • mostly A |
|     o access to the 'action arena' (i.e. Knowledge and Power) | • A and B |
| • actors' interpretations of formal and informal 'rules' (at the macro-level, a.k.a. rules for institutional and organisational behaviour) | • formal rules mostly structural attributes A and informal rules mostly Structural attributes B |

Table 2: relationship between Structural attributes and issues influencing organisational delivery

We have already said that we would use social science theory to understand better and suggest ways of overcoming problems. These problems have already been set out in our problem tree in Project D (LFA: figure 5) and which have also been highlighted in a recent DISTILLATE Project A Report (Hull, Tricker & Hills, 2006). These three problems are:
- to understand better the causes of the barriers between LA/PTE officers and external stakeholders and (based upon our forthcoming literature/data review of policy & institutional process) suggest ways of overcoming these,
- to understand better the internal cultural and structural barriers within LA/PTEs and (based upon our forthcoming literature/data review of policy & institutional process) suggest ways of overcoming these.

and the cross-cutting objective
- to understand better the barriers between technical expertise and its application in decision making and to suggest ways of overcoming these.

The theory that we are applying to reach our objectives is grounded in our case study work and includes social and political science, policy theory and a degree of social psychology. Political science can help with our understanding of the institutions of government and the political system while other social sciences offer insights into actors' roles and our understanding of their appreciation

of what is going on. Management theory combined with social psychology will be used to offer processural differences (see also FD1).

Following these two reports, The next stage in Project D is to use the analytical structure outlined in this and the other (FD1) document, and the output of the ongoing information & literature review, to suggest where we can best target our efforts to produce a step change in actors' behaviour. In particular, we will be using theories of policy change to show how understanding the networks within which actors work and how those actors perceive their role within the network is crucial. Our working assumption is that we need to create the social learning necessary to allow grounded, evidence-based knowledge to permeate the wider planning community.

## 1.3. Where this Report fits within the literature

### 1.3.1. Where it fits in to the social sciences and policy studies literature



Figure 2: Location of this Report within the wider context

In terms of where this report and its contents fit into the policy process, Figure 2 (above) shows where Figure 1 fits in to a bigger picture. It can be seen that the organisational and institutional issues are one of a range of issues which affect the policy process. Analysis of this arena suggests that the following areas are important:

- Structure and agency

- Politics (with a capital P), politics (with a small p) and innovation

These are now dealt with in more detail.

*Structure and agency– from a policy analysis point of view*

This report considers 'structural attributes A' and 'structural attributes B' (figure 1). There has been much debate in social and political sciences concerning the role of structure and agency where 'structure' is the system and its constraints on individual actors and 'agency' is the ability of an individual (actor) to act within the structure (see also discussion and Holy & Stucklik quote in section 1.2). In the past there has been an emphasis on the role of institutions (structure) in policy development. However, critics of this approach argue that this is too rigid and does not take account of human actions (agency). New institutional approaches emphasise the interaction of both structure and agency:

• Institutions are meso-level structures, devised by individuals, but constrain and structure the actions of individuals

• They have formal and informal dimensions: rules and laws but also customs or norms e.g. election rules, party systems, relations between different branches of government (Hudson and Lowe 149)

This approach also emphasizes the role that institutions have in shaping policy before decisions are made, limiting the scope of possibilities open to policymakers at the outset. (op cit. p155). Equally, post-structuralist policy analysis rejects an over emphasis on structure. As Gotteveis outlines, 'post structuralist policy analysis pays attention to…which institutions are legitimised and authorised to take part in the shaping or implementation of policy making – and which are not…these processes need to be understood within the discourses where actors are constituted and institutions framed as relevant in a given field' (Gotteveis 2004: 253). This perspective also takes the view that 'those who 'write' and create organisations or policy programmes should not be conceptualised as autonomous rational actors' (*op cit*. 254).



Fig 3: A framework for Institutional Analysis taken from Hess & Ostrom (2004).

On the other hand, Ostrom's definition of the 'action situation' (see Fig 3, centre of diag) refers to "the social space where participants with diverse preferences interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight" (Ostrom 2005). Institutional Rational Choice theory (IRC, after Elinor Ostrom) "defines policy change in terms of actions taken to change institutional arrangements within a decision situation that is partially shaped by institutional arrangements" (Schlager & Blomquist 1996) and thus the structure of the institutional arrangements must be explained.

One final observation on structure and agency is that we need to realise that there are some aspects arising out of sectoral and disciplinary grounding that we cannot affect. One is the fact that when we're dealing with multi-stakeholder engagement one person's process is the other person's tool or outcome. Thus, for transport planners and professionals, transport is the process, but for health or educational professionals – or, indeed for shopkeepers, transport is not the process but only a tool which is used by them as a means to an end. This will not change. However, this situation needs to and can be made more transparent. In any situation where organisational delivery needs the coming together of different sectoral interests we need social learning to occur. There are things which block dialogue. These 'blockers' also function to inhibit to social learning and these include:

- Blockers caused by power of perceived power relationships – ranging from pecking order to real or perceived disenfranchisement

- Blockers caused by language or lack of understanding – ranging from use of disciplinary jargon to access to 'black boxed' technologies

- Blockers caused by attitude – subtly different from the first in that here we are looking at politics with a small 'p' – in essence we are predisposed to agree with certain individuals or even types of individuals irregardless of what they say! (after Cuppen, 2006).

Cuppen defines blockers, or "biases" as any "distortion in the evaluation of another person's input … as a consequence of the perceived characteristics of that person" (Cuppen et al, 2006) and suggests that we probably cannot design a system which overcomes all of these institutional blockers at once. We agree, but groupings and combinations of structural changes and systems and processes can be made to work to overcome all three.


*Politics, politics, and innovation*

The wider social and political system is important in that it is part of the social structure which effects how significant actors within the policy process think and respond. For example, on the national stage, DoT became DETR, DTLR and then DfT with all the uncertainty and lack of security, as well as potential opportunity, which that entailed for LA transport personnel. Further, it must be recognised and acknowledged that transport is usually not at the top of the LA pecking order. This probably cannot be addressed. Long term changes in the political landscape have also meant that local government has lost out in terms of real power to central government (*i.e.* the power to effect change): of course some would have it that national governments themselves are losing out in terms of power to greater bureaucracies such as the European Commission but it is certainly true that, in the UK, central government keeps a tighter rein on local government that in some other countries.

Looking at the wider local politics picture, there is a movement from 'government' to 'governance' (referred to elsewhere) with a general move towards more 'open government'. However, against this there is also the widespread residue of a long-standing siloed thinking in LAs and in UK government in general and this matter will be returned to below. Thus, what is identified as happening in transport actually parallels what is happening or has happened in all other areas of local government/governance (see also the DISTILLATE Project C literature review for how indicators are used in other sectors of local government (Marsden, Kelly, Snell & Forrester 2005)). Nevertheless, transport itself – and particularly the more technical aspects of transport (modelling, etc.) – is rather expert-led and closed in LAs. Some [new] institutions (i.e. maybe some PTEs) *appear* to have

sidestepped this to a certain degree and the reasons for this will be explored further in the information and literature review. Paralleling this, and – in some local authorities and PTEs – removed from it, lies the move to democratise decision making that lies at the heart of Local Agenda 21 (see Snell 2004) . This democratisation of aspects of local governance (and local *government*) has had a knock-on effect on the activities of local transport planning departments but it has also lead to the mainstreaming of the environment as an issue.

Also largely as a result of LA21, the notion that citizens have the right to take part in decision making on issues that have an influence on their lives – rather than being represented in decision making forums by 'experts' – is now prevalent (see Forrester 1996). Notwithstanding, it is suggested that the idea is still prevalent in transport engineering and transport planning circles (note, these may be rather separate circles!) that it is possible to bring about environmental improvement and enhancement through technological development but we think that this message is too optimistic and simplistic. Bounded rationality suggests that not only knowledge, but also the capacity for imagination and deliberation can be bounded by the system. The strong influence of bounded rationality tends to make LAs – as institutions composed of individual actors – naturally conservative in terms of innovative behaviour. In other words, as is illustrated in figure 4 below, the system tends to force individual actors and LAs as institutions below the horizontal axis line into the area of business as usual. In real terms, what is often a low-risk and thus ideal course of action is to approach the intersection point of the axes; what might be described as the most innovative looking technology or policy not inducing actual innovation! However, then, when innovative behaviour *does* occur, when someone breaks out of the mould, actions are further bounded by the mindset of those actors who lead the breakout often resulting in policies options and solutions that either concentrate too much on the technical aspects (new infrastructure, top left, fig 4) or on 'soft' options (top right, fig 4). Thus, not only do local transport and land use planners need to overcome systemic-structural barriers to innovate they also need to overcome internally generated-structural barriers to generate innovative solutions that encompass both aspects of innovation.



Fig 4: schema of possible responses to the need for more sustainable urban environments.

The theory we've used so far has helped us understand the substantive issue of the report: structure, and its importance in all its attributes. In the remainder of this section we will introduce some other theory – which has also informed our thinking, but – which will further inform our information and literature review which is yet to come. [*NB* there is also a theory section which introduces the next section where specific theory is used to analyse empirical data].

Improvements in the situation outlined above (fig 4) are usually thought to be made by improved acceptance and implementation of successful policies via participatory assessments and processes (e.g. SEA). However, looking deeper into how this works we need to access "Social Learning" theory (after Albert Bandura 1977 & 1986 and pioneered in the policy field by Hugh Heclo). Based in education, and used successfully in psychology in the area of behaviour modification, social learning theory is a reaction to and improvement upon simple cognitive learning theories. Put simply, individuals learn by a process of cognitive learning. Individual actors within the structure learn by similar processes of cognitive learning. However, social learning goes beyond (simple) cognitive learning in that it changes the group-held norms (some of the 'attributes B' of Figure 1). Thus, one of the benefits of social learning theory is that it gives a means to emphasise how the individual actor can overcome the constraints imposed on her or him by the structure and, as Kemp & Weehuiszen (2005) put it "Social learning is often about values and other 'higher-order' properties such as norms, responsibilities, goals, and the framing of issues in terms of causes and effects" (p.4). (NB. Social learning is also referred to as cultural learning or – in our specific context – as policy learning. The following quote sums up our position:

> Learning is coloured by organisational views, interests and organisational culture and that learning is often a function of individual and organisational goals and incentives. Learning is not just an informational process. Argyris and Schon (1978) have shown how people filter and manipulate information flows: employees avoid passing on negative information to their superiors, they try not to be too closely identified with new projects in case they fail, and managers involved in decision-making frequently employ information selectively in order to legitimate decisions reached on "other grounds" (Easterby-Smith, 2000, p.1092) (in Kemp & Weehuiszen 2005).

> Policy learning is a form of collective learning, since policy is designed and implemented by a range of organizations. In that respect, policy learning as a topic for research is closer to the literature on organizational learning than the literature on individual learning. An important aspect of policy learning is that it generally involves learning not of one organization but of a number of organizations. This adds complexity in terms of who learns what and why, since there is not only interaction between individual frames of thinking in an organization but also interaction between collective frames of thinking of different organizations. (Kemp & Weehuiszen 2005)

This analysis also implies that we need to shift the culture of risk and blame prevailing in local government and systems of local governance to one which allows a greater acceptance of risk (by actors) and a redistribution of that risk. For social learning to occur, expert discourses must also be translated and visa versa. 'Public contract politics' helps to move the risk from planner or officer to elected members but this in turn makes member even more risk-averse and constrains possible courses of action available to officers and planners and emphasises the need to engage politicians as well as 'the public'. To get a step change we cannot accept the existing norms of politics.


### 1.3.2. Where it fits in with some current transport policy literature

The EU-funded *Transport Institutions in the Policy Process* (TIPP) project also set out as one of its goals to "provide a comprehensive and in-depth picture of institutional constraints to implementing transport policy" but it looked at a much larger stage than DISTILLATE in that it was looking at policy throughout Europe. Further, the social science in TIPP was grounded in economic and psychological theory whereas we hope to use more in-depth social, social-psychological, sociological, political and management theory analyses. However, the focus upon organisational and institutional

structures and processes is one that we share with TIPP (see TIPP Deliverable 2, May *et al* (2004: 8)). Our distinction between process and structure can be related to what was used in TIPP.



Fig 5: TIPP 'logic of discussion' diagram.


The above diagram is taken from the TIPP report (the arrows represent causal relationships). This project, DISTILLATE project D, and, thus, this Report is located almost entirely within this box and concentrates on the organisations and institutions (left-hand side), the planning and implementation frameworks, and the causal relationships (the arrows). DISTILLATE Project A looks at the barriers and constraints and policies and instruments are looked at in other DISTILLATE projects. See also fig 2 above which shows how these organisational and institutional issues fit in with the wider policy process.

# 2. Background to local government, barriers and drivers

This section begins with a brief explanation of the changing system of government, often described as the shift from government to governance. It then outlines some of the key barriers that are associated with transport policy development and delivery, in the context of the 'structural attributes A and B' described above.

## 2.1. Changes to the system of government

'The boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors have shifted in recent years, there has been major structural change, but critically, this has been accompanied by changing processes, especially the emergence of networking as the principal way in which policy is managed and delivered' (Hudson and Lowe 2001: 91). Table 3 outlines these changes:

|  | 1940s-1970s | 1980s-2000s |
|---|---|---|
| Structure | Unitary state; the Westminster model; strong central-local orientation | Fragmented state; devolved assemblies; weak local government; EU |
| Character | Bureaucratic; centralised | Quasi-governmental agencies; policy networks; centralisation of major policy instruments |
| Methods | Control of policy making and delivery; multilayered tiers of authority; macro-planning | Contracting out; New Public Management; public/private/voluntary networking; meso-and micro-focus |
| Culture | Interventionist state; Beveridge welfare state; Keynesian demand management | Stakeholder society; business orientation; neo liberal ethos |

Table 3 Changes to the system of government in the UK over time

These changes are often described as a shift from 'government' to 'governance' and are said to embrace the following themes:

- The relationship between the government, its core executive and the variety of quasi state and non-state actors and agencies in the public, private and voluntary sectors

- The use of policy networks to connect the system involving a high degree of self-regulation

- Policy networks are often self-regulating with considerable autonomy from the centre

- The role of networks as institutional filters, screening out policy change, directing the policy agendas and shaping incrementally policy directions (*ibid*: 92)

Changes to the system at the local government level have created a rather fragmented system of local government due to the reduction in local authority duties in favour of the private and in some instances voluntary sector. This has led to the loss of departmental responsibilities and powers, which in turn has had a significant impact on the way in which departments operate. Also, the shift from government to governance has led to the view that policy is made and implemented through policy networks that consist of a range of both public, private and not for profit actors. The introduction of a wider range of stakeholders into the decision making process has made policy development and delivery more complex. In addition to the loss of departmental responsibilities and powers principles of 'new public management' (NPM) have been embraced. Managerial approaches previously used in

the private sector have been introduced into the public sector (in an ad hoc rather than universal fashion it must be noted). These have placed a greater emphasis on management, performance, objectives and targets. One of the characteristics of the NPM is a distrust of 'professionalism' (Hudson and Lowe) or expertise, and indeed, there has been a greater tendency to contract out duties and responsibilities, through service contracts, partnership contracts, service agreements and informal agreements (Spicker 2006: 19).

Fragmentation of local government and the existence of a wide range of actors in the policy arena (and thus policy networks) has lead more recently to an increased interest in partnership working. As Spicker points out partnerships 'depend on relationships of reciprocity and interdependence; issues are resolved through negotiation and diplomacy rather than through the exercise of authority. Partnerships are formal systems for bringing together a range of agencies, they take a variety of forms – some are little more than forums for discussion, while other have a legal status and substantial budgets in their own right.' (2006: 22)

These issues are of importance to this report because they set the policy context at the local government level, highlighting the importance of structural changes, engagement with non-public sectors, and how this has transformed the policies arenas of local transport and land use. Traditionally, transport has been a policy sector with a history of stability, incremental changes in policy direction at the hands of closed professional policy communities (Vigar 2000:19, Evans 2001:126, Rydin 1997:165)[1]. However, departments have been subject to a process of deregulation, privatisation and competition, and these have had a profound impact on the way in which policy development and delivery occurs (Vigar 2000:21). For example, an ECMT report (May 2003) outlines elements of the transport system that are outside the direct influence of local government:

- 'Roads which are part of the national network are the responsibility of the Highways Agency

- All new rail infrastructure projects (except light rail schemes unconnected to the network) have to be agreed with the Strategic Rail Authority and Network Rail

- All changes in rail services have to be agreed with the relevant operator

- All changes in bus services outside London have to be negotiated with the relevant operators

- Local authorities outside London have no influence over bus and rail fares; even in London this influence does not extend to the surface rail network

- Local authorities can only encourage the provision of appropriate information on public transport services

- Local authorities have little direct control on the operation of privately owned public car parks

- Local authorities can only control the way in which private car parks are operated if they introduce a workplace levy' (May 2003: 7)

Whilst there has been a long tradition within local government of compartmentalised policymaking that is largely organised around the provision of services. Reductions in departmental powers have often seemed to strengthen this outlook as departments do not wish to relinquish any further responsibilities. As a result, despite attempts of 'joined up thinking' local government level policy making can still be made in quite a siloed fashion. These issues are reflected in the transport sector and how the transport sector interacts with other departments. The most significant barriers and facilitators are summarised in Table 4, these are taken from Stead (2003), Jones (1996), and are also informed by the A2 report (Hull et. al 2006). The barriers discussed at the top of the left hand column relate to the system of local government, secondly, the impact that these have in policy terms: structural attributes A and B from Figure 1, and thirdly, the role of politics and political issues. The right hand column outlines a number of the facilitators of organisational coordination. These are

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[1] The 1990s witnesses a change in direction from 'predict and provide' to more of a demand management approach

implicit in the themes discussed below, rather than dealt with explicitly. This section now goes on to discuss these three issues:

- the barriers resulting from structural attributes 'A';

- the barriers resulting from structural attributes 'A' and structural attributes 'B', and

- the barriers resulting from politics and the political processes

in more depth.

| Inhibitors of organisational coordination | Facilitators of organisational coordination |
|---|---|
| *Causes of divisions of responsibilities*<br>Centralisation<br>Fragmentation of the regional/local levels of government<br><br>*Structural Attributes A*<br>Bureaucratisation<br>Professionalisation<br>Specialisation<br>Infrequent/inadequate internal and external communication<br>Little or no boundary permeability/roles<br>Disparities in staff training | Strategic commitment (this includes long term goals rather than shorter term tactics<br>Legislative support & funding<br>Long term relationships with partners (including the business sector)<br>Commitment & input from key directorates (Jones, T 1996: 104) |
| *Structural Attributes B*<br>Poor historical relations/image formation<br>Perceived threat/competition<br>Perceived loss of organisational and programme identity/strategic positions<br>Perceived loss of organisational-leader-staff prestige/authority/domains<br>Inter- and intraprofessional differences<br>Lack of common language<br>Different priorities/ideologies/outlooks/goals<br>Differing organisational-leader-professional socialisation<br>Costs outweigh benefits (of joint working)<br><br>*The impact of politics and political processes*<br>Vested interests<br>Political short termism (Atkins 2005: 6-7)<br><br>(Adapted from Stead 2003: 334) | *A2 suggests the following to be important factors (Hull et al 2006: 13)*:<br>Shared aspirational policy goals organisational commitments and linkages<br>Government/Legislative requirements on services and processes<br><ul><li>E.g. Cross-cutting Local Area Agreements, Corporate Plans, and Community Strategies</li><li>$CO_2$ reduction and other environmental initiatives</li><li>Common land-use and transport policy objectives</li><li>Requirements to address travel issues in departmental policies and guidance from central government, e.g. in encouraging corporate citizenship</li><li>European and national statutory environmental processes (SEA, EIA, environmental Directives for air quality, noise, etc.)</li></ul>As a response to outside agencies and agendas<ul><li>Access to funding</li><li>Problems and external forcing</li></ul> |

Table 4: Inhibitors and facilitators of organisational coordination

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## 2.2 Barriers resulting from structural attributes 'A' – Division & reduction of responsibilities

### 2.2.1. Local authority structures

There are two main ways in which local political structures and boundaries impact on policy development and delivery. Firstly, the division of responsibilities between a number of different organisations, and secondly, the way in which responsibilities are allocated within organisations.

In Great Britain (with reference to transport) there are different structures of local government:

- The Greater London Authority and London Boroughs within London

- Metropolitan Districts and Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs)

- Unitary Authorities in the larger English towns outside the conurbations

- County and district councils in most of rural England

- Unitary Authorities reporting to the Scottish Executive

- A largely two tier structure reporting to the Welsh Assembly in Wales (May 2003: 7)

As DISTILLATE Project D is undertaking case study work in England with two PTEs, one Metropolitan City Council, a Unitary Authority and a County Council (and two of the 11 borough councils) it is these structures that we discuss now. The relevant duties of these are illustrated in Table 5

| Area of Responsibility | Joint Authorities | PTEs | Metropolitan Borough & City Councils | Unitary Councils | District Councils | County Councils | Central Government Department |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Education* | | | * | * | | * | DfES |
| *Housing* | | | * | | * | * | DCLG |
| *Planning Applications* | | | * | * | * | | DCLG |
| *Strategic Planning* | | | * | * | * | * | DCLG |
| *Transport Planning* | | | * | * | | * | DfT |
| *Local Transport Plans* | * | * (facilitation role) | | * | | * | DfT (DCLG) |
| *Passenger Transport* | * | * | | * | | * | DfT |
| *Highways* | | | * | * | | * | DfT |
| *Leisure & Recreation* | | | * | * | * | | DCMS |
| *Environmental Health* | | | * | * | * | | DEFRA |

Table 5 The distribution among different local authority types of responsibilities relevant to transport and land use planning.

As illustrated by table 5, under the two tier system the larger scale county level has control over the setting of policy areas such as transport, whereas the smaller scale district or borough level has control

over issues relating to planning. If the county and district do not work collaboratively policy development and delivery can be hampered (**communication & structural differences**). The existence of regional levels of government with different administrative duties can also make policy development and implementation even more complex (**bureaucratisation**).

The makeup of the local authority can also have an important impact on policy development. The focus and remit of different departments within the local authority may determine the focus and remit of resulting policies. For example, Snell (2004) finds that an environmental policy located within a regeneration and development department has a very different focus to one located within an environment department. Also, the issue of physical location discussed above isn't limited to two tier LAs and PTEs. Different departments within a unitary or city council may be located throughout a town or city, and if this is reinforced by cultural or ingrained behaviours then it can dissuade cooperation or joined up thinking. Also, the remit of different departments can lead to quite specific skill bases (**professionalisation**, **specialisation** and **training**).

### 2.2.2. Changing responsibilities at the local level

This section began by outlining changes to the system of government, describing the reduction in local authority powers. This has had two significant impacts; firstly, from a practical perspective the degree of control Local Authorities and PTEs have over transport provision is more limited than previously. Secondly, the nature of the policy networks that have developed around the policy development stage of transport and land use policies.

In terms of transport, lack of control over the rail network (in the case of our Unitary, Metropolitan, and County and partial lack of control in the case of the PTE), and privatised or deregulated transport systems are considered to be the most significant challenges in the delivery of local sustainable transport solutions. These points have been explored in the DISTILLATE Scoping Study which finds that private ownership causes difficulties in achieving social objectives for rail and bus transport provision. The ability of the PTE to concentrate on developing strategic and practical links with bus and rail operators puts it in a better situation to overcome these barriers. For example, bus operators increase bus fares (due to increased costs for drivers, fuel etc.) which may contradict with the need to retain and increase the number of passengers. Equally, commercial objectives make it difficult to sustain Park & Ride facilities during the weekday inter-peak period and deregulation makes it more difficult to achieve modal integration (Hull *et al* 2004: 6-7). The greater scale and the greater unity of purpose of the PTE allow it to influence bus and train operators more although at a more micro-level some unitaries do seem to be able to reach mutually beneficial agreements with bus operating companies. The scoping study also finds that it is difficult to involve bus operators in projects other than 'simple' transport projects or to gain their commitment in them. This, in turn, delays projects or even prevents them from being implemented at the Local Authority level. The DISTILLATE    A2 report also contributes to our understanding of this issue, finding that the privatisation of transport services hampers joined up thinking. Respondents to the A2 study expressed concerns about 'the development of quasi-monopoly situations on being able to implement a package of sustainable transport solutions. The deregulation of bus services caused problems which included:

- a lack of integrated ticketing,

- decreasing bus patronages,

- no control over service levels, fares, or quality of service (e.g. withdrawal of financially unviable services to health facilities and threats to services, following repatriation of patients from hospitals to more community-focussed health facilities),

- limits to what could be done to improve accessibility using the bus system

- limited council ownership/subsidy of routes,

- limited nationwide investment in clean-engined buses and lack of ready ability to prescribe higher than mandatory vehicle emissions standards, can lead to monopoly situations and a lack of strong local competition between passenger transport operators' (Hull et. al. 2006: 32)

The DISTILLATE A2 report also gives examples of 'closed' processes of transport and land-use scheme development, making it difficult for other stakeholders in the process to understand decision-making or aid its development. The report also highlights the significance of the aims and objectives of different departments, and the impact this has on joined up thinking (*op cit*. p22).

*Conflicting policy drivers*

As outlined above, the makeup of local policy networks can also have an impact on policy development, and can be associated with inhibiting policy change. Traditionally economic interests are dominant at the local level, and it can be difficult to overcome these, Chatterton and Style (2001: 226) argue that the 'traditional ground for local policy networks has been economic development in which environmental concerns and sustainable development play a peripheral part'. Rydin finds that local level policy networks can inhibit policy change at the local level, she notes that transport and economic development are areas with a tight knit policy community and the two communities may not interact successfully. She comments 'the attempt to create a sustainable development issue network over and above an existing urban pattern of issue networks and policy communities (which will be dominated by professional and economic interests) will face severe difficulties (Rydin 1997: 164). Winnard & Cannibal (2001:46) also noted that within local authorities "the organisation-wide formal and informal communication networks necessary for efficient cultural change had not been built" so there is no mechanism to challenge the cultural hegemony of a successful policy network. On the other hand, Rydin does find that environmental groups and movements form part of the wider issue networks in her case study cities. She comments that 'the success of an initiative [based on developing a partnership of NGOs, business and the public sector] is dependent on breaking up to some extent the underlying policy communities and then transforming the sustainable development issue network into a policy community be providing resources and activating resource dependencies' (1997: 165). In other words, some interests dominate policy arenas at the cost of others. These issues are evident in our local authority areas, and although the substantive policy network which dominates may be different in difference cases, it is the case that the economic seems to dominate.

## 2.3. Barriers resulting from structural attributes 'A' and structural attributes 'B'

There is empirical evidence to suggest that the structural issues discussed above can lead to perceptions that are 'compartmentalised', with 'blinkered outlooks' that hinder the ability of local authorities to think and act creatively and flexibly and, indeed, the indication from DISTILLATE Project E fieldwork is that this is also the case when local authority officers look for funding for transport projects.

As mentioned above, transport as a policy sector is a historically closed, tight knit policy community, and even if this is starting to change, individuals and professionals may still carry 'cultural baggage' ingrained in traditional ways of thinking about and solving given problems (Vigar 2000: 25). See the left hand column of table 4 'barriers resulting from structural attributes B' for a list of some of the effects of such traditions.

These factors can reinforce silos and dissuade joined up thinking. One instance of this is obvious in the area of *Option Choice* (see also Jones et *al*. DISTILLATE Project B *Literature Review*). For various reasons (fiscal, but also due to a cultural siloed mentality) transport engineers tend to come up with transport engineering solutions to transport problems (PTEs can be a particular example of this). Similarly, though, transport itself has been ring-fenced and hidden by others so that many actors now see transport – and solutions to transport problems – as being the domain (and duty) of the transport planner. Up until now, transport engineers have been successful in solving local urban transport

problems and this has given rise to a situation where it is almost assumed that the transport professionals can solve any transport problem by providing a transport-inspired solution. In some instances there is little incentive, on either the part of the transport or other policy actors, to truly look outside transport planning and engineering and provide genuine joined up policy making at local level.

Also, the location of powerbrokers within the local authority – and their perception of their own power as well as others within the organisation perception of their power – can often be important to both the *Output* (whether or not there is a successful, strong policy) and the *Outcome* (whether or not it is the 'right' policy which has the desired for effect(s). This issue is often largely overlooked in policy evaluation.


## 2.4. Barriers resulting from politics and the political processes

Political processes and situations have a direct impact on policy development and are influenced by structure as discussed above (see section 1.2). As discussed above, there is still a policy focus on economic development as opposed to policy issues that might be regarded as environment related (Rydin, Vigar, Mittler) with an ensuing overall devaluation of the environment benefits of transport improvements that cannot be shown to have a direct economic impact. Local economic interests have tended to occupy a privileged position in relation to transport policy (Vigar 2000: 26, Rydin 1997) and transport costs have tended to remain hidden. Political short-termism concerns about political popularity can all have a negative impact on policy development and can be especially damaging to policies that have long term aims such as sustainable development (Atkins 2005: 3-9). On the other hand, in some instances these factors can have the opposite effect. These issues are also raised in the A2 report, which find several examples of officers' work that has been skewed away from the objective delivery of sustainable transport strategies and schemes**,** towards satisfying the political wishes of portfolio members for transport at the local level. Also, on some occasions, Members' understanding and commitment to sustainable development was said to be poor, and therefore organisational leadership on these issues was lacking (Hull et al. 2006: iii).

## 2.4.1 Barriers between technical expertise and its application in decision making

Barriers between tool developers and those using them have already been identified by the Scoping Study. These include the lack of accurate decision making support techniques to assess various policy initiatives. Another respondent argued that the available models and the NATA appraisal are biased in favour of car-based developments. Tools were seen 'not to come up with the right answers' (Hull *et al* 2004: p12) and so are often discounted or remain unused to the fullness of their capacity.

Following on from the discussion of 'blockers' at the end of section 1.3.1, where we identified language used as one of the potential barriers to reaching a common interpretation of the problem – and as a result a common understanding of the possible solutions – here we focus upon where ideas, methods, values and norms have been fine-tuned within organisations to attempt to overcome barriers to the use of good-quality, robust data. While the hegemony of economic analyses results in a parallel dominance of the attitude of many policy actors in our case studies, experiments in 'new forms of knowledge production' (after Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny *et al* 1994), particularly around air quality management (see Forrester, Potts and Rosen, 2002) and involving the same transport actors, show great promise as a way forward to create a common ground regarding technical and non-technical assessment. Further, more 'social' agendas are also to be found within many significant transport actors in our case studies. Thus, in their day-to-day work the question that exercises many transport actors is not how to bring the technical assessment into the political arena but rather how, and *when*, to bring the political into the 'technical' assessment. It is the perceived inability of many technical tools to have this level of political acuity which is the main barrier to their use. This raises what is probably one of the most notable insights arising from our fieldwork so far and it ties in also with

DISTILLATE Projects C and G on Indicators and Appraisal. It is that, because of the political structure, the transport professional's process is in fact often the policymaker's outcome. Thus the tools of the transport process: appraisal, modelling and so on, become tools to be used within wider processes by policy actors to attain goals which may or may not be transport related.

# 3. Case study findings: an outline of key traits and barriers

This section firstly provides some background to our main case study areas before providing an analysis of the main barriers. Firstly, this section considers 'Structural attributes A' - those relating to physical structural issues, it then considers responses to such structures, and finally political issues. It closes with a section relating this data to the three objectives of DISTILLATE Project D from the LFA.

The following section considers issues of local authority structure, and also changing roles and responsibilities, as described in the background section. It must be noted that this section outlines the background and context *specific* to our case study areas rather than describing these different types of authority in general terms. As our fieldwork progresses so will our knowledge of these issues.

## 3.1. PTE-level case study

Although the PTE parallels the County Council in responsibility for production of the LTP2, it is obvious that the relationship between the PTE and the local authorities ('boroughs') is by definition different from the borough/county council relationship outlined above. One significant difference is that the PTEs are only Passenger Transport Executives and thus responsible for public transport: planning, provision, infrastructure, but not roads. Thus, the Boroughs retain their own roads & transport departments with control over:

- car parking,

- highways (engineering but also services such as gritting),

- urban traffic control and management (*i.e.* traffic lights),

- street lights, and

- roads and footway maintenance.

Nonetheless, the local authorities and the PTE worked together to produce the first LTP which was published in July 2000 and they worked together again on LTP2 which was published as a provisional document in July 2005 with the final version submitted to DfT in March 2006. As such, those creating the LTP are concerned with strategic planning of all aspects of transport while the PTE is concerned more with strategic planning of passenger transport alone. At the moment, these goals are concurrent and the main objectives of the area's LTP2 are:

- To ensure that transport supports sustainable economic development and regeneration;

- To moderate the upward trend in car use and secure a shift to more sustainable forms of transport such as walking, cycling and public transport;

- To secure the most efficient and effective use of the existing transport network;

- To enhance the quality of life of those who live, work in and visit the PTE region.

The LTP goes on to say that the measures in the plan are "all intended to provide an improved, more efficient, better quality, more integrated, more accessible transport system …". Whilst the LTP

writing team that facilitated the production of LTP2 were seconded from the PTE – they engaged fully with the Borough roads departments and with the City Region framework writing team in drawing up the plan so that it would reflect the wider needs of the region (*e.g.* economic development) as well as its aspirations. This LTP team also brought the drafts of LTP2 out to the Borough LSPs (Local Strategic Partnerships – the body set up post LA21 and which now oversees the LAA (Local Area Agreement) to ensure that needs were reflected at a local as well as regional level.

### The PTE and regional authority

The LTP is fully integrated with the various regional and local borough plans and strategies but the contrary cannot always be said. For example, the LAA of at least one borough makes, as part of its vision, the creation of a "safe, attractive and rich environment with a choice of good transport facilities for all" yet makes very little mention of the role of transport in delivering in its key policy areas of:

- Safer and stronger communities

- Economic development and enterprise

- Healthier communities and older people, and

- Children and young people.

It will no doubt remain, nevertheless, that the PTE as transport provider, as well as the Boroughs' roads and transport engineers, will be called upon to provide **transport** solutions to these social and economic problems. Accessibility Mapping (again, largely driven by the PTE) should point us towards different solutions but the persistence of accessibility mapping within the domain of the transport professional will possibly simply maintain the siloed mindset of transport solutions.

### The PTE and adjoining areas

In practical terms the structure of borough transport provision is influenced by a range of factors which are much wider than simply in which county or PTE area the borough is located. Thus, pragmatically, the planners, officers elected members and residents of border boroughs need to balance their identity with their own region with a pragmatic need to work with their neighbour: this is particularly true when that neighbour is itself a big player in the larger region. In our PTE case study area, Borough planners need to keep an eye on two City Region Strategies and need to engage with the Regional Development Agency and Regional Government offices more than would be necessary for boroughs nested towards the heart of the PTE or county area. This can be strength for the borough itself in that it develops good links with the RDA and can position itself more centrally in regional issues. However, it also necessitates a greater investment in terms of person hours by the borough.

## 3.2. County Council-level case study

### County and Borough level transport

Our current fieldwork with a County Council (CC) has given some degree of insight into the impact of physically divided responsibilities. The CC has responsibility for the development of LTP2, whilst the local districts and boroughs (from hence on referred to as boroughs for ease) have responsibility for planning via the Local Development Framework (LDF). There are meant to be synergies between LTP2 and the LDF, however, the only formal link made by the ODPM (now Department for Communities and Local Government) is to accessibility planning.

In our CC case study, prior to April 2002, the Borough councils had a highways agency agreement with the CC. Borough staff worked on the following Agency functions:

- Transportation Development and control

- Scheme delivery (LTP)

- Maintenance projects – major/minor & routine

- Borough Local plan, i.e. transportation issues

- Forward planning, housing

- Input into the County structure plan

- Additionally to the Agency, the Borough's own local area schemes

- Highways Cttee, which resolved Agency matters & the Borough own works

- Boroughs also contributed additional funding to the Agency functions

Our fieldwork to date also gives the impression that the highways agency arrangement was useful because Borough employees (working via the agency agreement) were doing borough level tasks and were therefore well placed to talk to a range of different local stakeholders about projects, schemes, and issues.

Post April 2002 the CC-staffed Local Transportation Service (LTS) (took over responsibilities for local transport issues after the termination of the highways agency agreement (although the staff remained the same). A Local Committee was also created in each borough (the LTS reporting to the local transportation sub committee).

At the time of writing[2], each borough has an LTS connected to it, which is staffed through the CC but based within the Borough (although it is likely that those employed were previously involved with the highways agency agreement). There are also two levels of local councillor, county and borough, and both sit on local transportation committee meetings. As outlined above, post 2002, in one borough, County-level staff were physically moved out of the BC offices – moving a mile and a half away. In 2003 the CC consolidated its maintenance/project delivery engaging 2 main contractors (West & East). The main contractor (West) is located 10 miles away, and so again, this level of familiarity was removed. Also, as a result of accessibility planning (LTP2) being trialled in the Borough, there have been more formal meetings anyway (see also issues of governance relating to structure in section 2.2). The borough level LDF and County level LTP2 are meant to be linked, although, the only formal link is accessibility planning.

## County and Borough level planning

In addition to these issues, the CC has responsibility for housing, and for housing allocations (that have come from national and regional level demands), however, the borough planning departments have to deal with the implications of the allocations, and approve specific development proposals. The housing development is an interesting, if not unique case study in the county. Historically speaking, the CC 'forced' the 2,500 new home development upon a relatively small town, leaving much of the fallout with the Borough level planners, and thus there was quite a negative relationship between the CC and the Borough. However, this can also be seen as an imposition upon the CC as homes are being forced upon the county by the Regional Assembly. The local relationship has been restored, more or less, there are good working relationships, and a joint Borough/CC post has been created, however, the political issue of having to build the housing in the local area remains.

In our CC case study area, the institutional networks are strongest at the sub-regional level with good relationships with bordering Councils, who have worked closely with the Regional Assembly on the revised Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS). The CC looks down to the Boroughs when working on housing issues (see 2.1.1) and up to the Regional Assembly and Regional Government Offices when discussing transport priorities. Although there is a strategic alignment on these issues at the regional

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[2] Shortly, this will be reduced to 3 larger LTS's that cover a larger area

level this is much less evident at the level of practical policy intervention. There are also significant boundary issues for the Council with the neighbouring economically buoyant city region. The CC is strongly linked to the economic fortunes of this region through the provision of dormitory homes and transport services to the city region. CC planners need to keep an eye on the wider growth strategies to ensure that the Council area can cater for the demands for improved infrastructure without compromising the quality of life for all those who live in the Council area.

*County, borough and private sector responsibilities*

The housing development also requires numerous working relationships with the private sector including property developers, land owners, an airport and bus companies. The complexities described in the background section are present as public sector and private sector responsibilities meet.

## 3.3. Metropolitan council and Unitary Authority case studies

The need to deal with the private sector is one element of our CC case study, however, it plays a much more central role in our Metropolitan City Council and Unitary Authority case studies. The first, lead by SEI focuses on the role of a regeneration company, the second, lead by UWE investigates a partnership between the council and bus company.

In our Metropolitan City Council a regeneration company has taken some of the powers from the council which in effect has given up its Dept of Employment & Economic Development. This department ceased to exist and its function went into Planning Services and, of course, the regeneration company. The regeneration company is a public private partnership (PPP) and there is a clear need to work effectively with the private sector, despite the different working practices and set up, physical location, aims and objectives. It has its own staff and its own budget – it has about 15 staff which is enough to make it a viable organisation with an distinct ethos. It does not mirror the expertise of the other organisations (such as the council) but instead concentrates on project management. The regeneration company is housed separately from council offices, and this, along with its focus on project management is thought to encourage a distinct, separate entity.

In our Unitary Authority, one of many initiatives in the area is that the Council has entered into a partnership arrangement with the bus company committing both parties to providing improvements to the bus service along priority routes. As part of this agreement, new vehicles have been provided by the bus company. Funding the street improvements and paying for additional drivers has been an issue for the Unitary causing delays to the operation of additional services. Besides the bus company, the Unitary has had to work with several external organisations in the design and implementation stages. The alterations to street parking and street closures required consultation with street traders and businesses, the emergency services, the freight haulage association as well as the bus company before submitting a Traffic Regulation Order. Enforcement of parking restrictions will also require partnership with the Police and the local community to be effective.

## 3.4. Key barriers and drivers

The issues discussed above have a potentially negative impact on policy development and delivery. These barriers are discussed below, and relate both to the physical structure and the way in which behaviours develop in response to this structure (structural attributes A and B). The barriers discussed here strongly relate to those outlined in our background section. There are three main areas where barriers occur; when policy responsibilities are divided across a number of organisations, when organisations work with a number of different departments and sectors without clearly defined relationships, and when there is a need to work with sectors where there is no previous history of joint working.

### 3.4.1. Divided policy responsibilities

Firstly, the division of various policy responsibilities across a number of different organisations can have a potentially negative effect. How closely one department or organisation decides to work with another can have an impact on both policy development and working relations. In our CC, whilst the borough councils (including planning departments) were consulted during the development of LTP1 (apparently because it was so groundbreaking at the time), they had little input into LTP2. Several Boroughs have been concerned about this lack of input, especially given their role as 'transport hub'. As a result, tensions have developed in a number of boroughs.

Physical proximity between different organisations appears to contribute significantly to both to the decision to pursue collaborative working, and to effective policy development and delivery once this decision has been made. In the case of our PTE and CC housing different administrative departments/levels within the same building has been regarded as a positive measure. In the case of the PTE, having the LTP writing team physically located in the PTE offices has made a level of spatially joined up as well as disciplinary joined up thinking possible. Although, it is important to note, that this has necessitated a clear demarcation of individual actors' roles (in this case by the use of different business cards with a discrete LTP 'branding').

In our CC, there is a history of collaborative working between a number of the boroughs and the CC. It is thought that this history of collaboration is encouraging improved joint working between the LDF and LTP2, and may encourage further forms of collaboration. In the case of the borough where the LTS is based in the same physical location as the planning department and other departments, it is considered to be extremely beneficial to policy development and delivery. Despite the difference in function and financing, the LTS and planning department have a good relationship where planning proposals are shared with the LTS, and issues that fall under the LTS's remit (e.g. elements of section 106) are shared with the planning department. The physical location of the LTS, consistency of staff, recognition of the importance and added value of joint working, similar goals, along with existing good relationships and working patterns between the CC and the Borough, are all said to be reasons for collaborative working. Interestingly, whilst having the two levels of government in the same site is thought to have lead to improved, informal relationships (which are missed when taken away – see below), the importance of formal meetings was also emphasised by staff in this Borough.

However, in the second Borough of the CC study, the physical split between the LTS and the Borough council has had a negative effect on working relations. By separating borough from county level staff, informal relationships have been removed – for example, the opportunity to chat over lunch or in the corridor, and also general familiarity with people. The impact of this division shouldn't be overstated, as the positive relationship, culture of joint working, and existing working practices resulting from previous working patterns have ensured that joint working is continued. However, without the informal element, staff are more reliant on formalised regular meetings that don't necessarily correspond with the pace of developments. And informal links will diminish over time if not maintained in some other way.

Clearly, physical proximity isn't everything, because the problems have been overcome in our example. However, this demonstrates that it does encourage joint working and relationship building - key drivers for further collaborative work.

Analysis of key barriers:
- Lack of willpower/coordination/communication
- Shakeups of successful working practices

Analysis of key drivers:
- Physical proximity is a positive providing roles and responsibilities are clearly demarcated
- History of collaborative working
- Consistency of staff
- Recognition of the importance and added value of joint working
- Similar goals

### 3.4.2. Administrative disjointedness

Secondly, ways of working with sectors spanning beyond immediate policy making circles, but where there are often clear links, can suffer from ambiguous and inconsistent relationships. In the cases of both our CC and PTE, organisational structure has an impact on the relationships that are developed with other public sector bodies. In some instances this can hamper the development of potentially beneficial relationships. In our PTE area the 5 local authorities and the PTE itself have different administrative duties, in some instances it is clear where the two types of organisation should be working together (such as the development of LTP2), but at other times this is ambiguous (for example the local authorities can potentially have a relationship with the Highways Agency from which the PTE is excluded). In fact, the local authority looks more to the Government Office (the body to which the local authority submits its LAA for approval) than to any other local or regional body for endorsement of the LAA; additionally the Government Office looks to the ODPM (now DCLG) rather than any other government department. The relative lack of the mention of transport provision's central place within the actual delivery of the aspirations, with respect to the Borough's key LAA issues of 'worklessness'[sic.], 'health' and 'livibility', are possibly therefore a reflection of cultural disaggregation at a level of government higher than that being studied. This leads to a rather unclear and inconsistent relationship between the two organisations. This issue has lead to difficulties with the coordination of Accessibility Mapping.

This issue has acted as a barrier in our CC, where the growth issues of location and proper investment in infrastructure and services have become key issues over the long term for the CC to address. Their forward planning has been hindered by the lack of technical information coming from regional organisations, particularly the Assembly which was projecting forward based on past trends. There have been high levels of frustration about external events which are out of the CCs hands to control. The Regional Economic Strategy (RES) identifies economic hubs as economic drivers for the region, setting the Regional Transport Strategy economic targets to deliver. These different sectoral requirements have required a quantum change in transport planning with the planners working with a range of levels and types of government agency in developing LTP2. The CC has often found that access to the DfT has had to be via the Government Office in the region, which makes the process remote and third hand. DfT has been testing out a pilot Regional Transport Board in the region as a consensus mechanism to address the wider strategic issues of prioritization of infrastructure requirements. For the CC this gives a more direct avenue to the DfT, HA and SRA, who attend meetings in an advisory capacity, to raise the cross-boundary issues and to improve strategy and programme coordination with their neighbours. How influential this forum turns out to be has yet to be discovered.

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Analysis of key barriers:
- The wide range of objectives (which aren't necessarily compatible)
- A lack of clearly defined relationships between organisations
- One way relationships (i.e. where one organisation is more keen on joint working than the other)
- Different priorities at different levels

Analysis of key facilitators:
- Clearly defined relationships and reasons for collaborative working

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### 3.4.3. Non existent relationships

Thirdly, extending joint working beyond traditional sectors can be a great challenge. The nature of a scheme or strategy will determine the extent to which it is necessary to work with different levels of government and other relevant organisations. As outlined in the background section, barriers may occur as a result of disciplinary differences, different practices, priorities and perceptions that exist

between sectors without a history of joint working. In our PTE area, very localised issues such as walking, cycling, local roads, and local busses can be dealt with at the local level and with the local PTE but more regional issues; train and longer distance highways, necessitate being dealt with at a more cross-organisation level involving partners based, and with interests, outside the PTE area.

In our CC study, the scale of one housing development has meant that joint working is necessary, however, the education department (County controlled), and the leisure department (Borough controlled) have been difficult to engage in what has been viewed as a planning issue. Equally, in our Metropolitan City Council case study, there has been difficulty getting the police and education sectors involved in what are perceived to be transport issues. The PTE has had a similar experience. There has been some success in involving some borough Social Services in a transport project related to people with learning disabilities, and accessibility however, other sectors have been unwilling to collaborate, again seeing the issue as outside their remit.

Working with organisations with different working practices, aims and objectives is challenging, and this is embodied in the work our Metropolitan City Council is pursuing with the private sector. Whilst no direct barriers have been reported, a more business-orientated approach has been adopted in order to allay concerns and perception that the public sector is bureaucratic, slow moving, and generally incompatible with the needs of the private sector.

One significant difference between the LAs and the PTE is that the PTE, with its particular transport focus, tends to have good working relationships with transport operators and external transport stakeholders. On the other hand, the LAs, as they have a wider strategic remit, often have good working relationships with a wider range of external stakeholders. For example, the transport department of a local authority is nested within an organisation which has links with education, health, economic development and so on. Even if the transport planner does not have a day-to-day working relationship with a health professional it is often the case that someone within her or his organisations does. PTEs do not, naturally, have these relationships.

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Analysis of key barriers:
- Perceptions about disciplinary boundaries remit, working practices, and
- Concerns about losing control over discrete policy areas
- Contacts and existing working relationships maybe limited

Analysis of key facilitators:
- Communication & good relationships
- Ability to see 'bigger picture' rather than sectoral interests
- Partnerships have to be sustained
- Business type approach rather than a bureaucratic one may help dealing with the private sector

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### 3.4.4 Politics and political processes/systems within the Authority (as they are affected by structure)

A number of issues related to politics and political structures have arisen from our case study work. As with the previous section, some of the key issues arising from the case study areas are described before we consider how these act as barriers and facilitators.

*County council issues*

In our CC there are a number of issues related to the two tier structure of the local authority. The creation of the local committee system which was designed in part to make local transport decisions comprises of both county and borough Councillors. The local committee has to prepare a theme bid

to ensure funding for local transportation purposes. Historically, local councillors tend to put a focus on issues relating to road safety, because these are thought to have a resonance with local people. However, in order to avoid the over politicisation of borough level transport issues, proposals (generally identified by members of the public, elected members, and partner agencies) are scored against LTP2 criteria (as this is thought to attract higher levels of funding), and then discussed in a task group that considers transportation issues before they go to the local committee. The structure of the local committee system leads to very specific interactions between policymakers and elected members. Debating issues informally helps to consider local knowledge of the councillors (i.e. there may be particular public views on an issue, or a development that is being considered but that hasn't got to any formal stage), and also seek some form of consensus. Then the issues are formally debated at the committee. The amount of involvement that the district level gets in this process can be quite limited. Whilst several of the councillors on the committee are district level councillors, all others involved work for the county funded LTS.

*Unitary authority*

Whilst our Unitary authority does not have different administrative tiers, policy development and implementation is heavily influenced by the political setup – in this case a cabinet system. This encourages particular behaviours within the authority, and it is openly acknowledged that decisions are made before they are taken to cabinet.

Political cycles play an important role in decision making in all our case study areas. Timing often influences how and when policies are developed, for example, in our unitary authority it is widely acknowledged that decisions have to be made within a 2 year timeframe as politicians will not make difficult decisions close to an election. This is also an issue in the CC, where borough level councillors especially are very conscious of issues of political acceptability.

*Key barriers and facilitators*

In all our case study areas, local politics and political campaigns have an impact on policy development and outcomes. Local politicians may be unwilling to appear to make extreme choices (for example introduce a road charge) especially if an election is on the horizon. However, local political issues can also have a beneficial effect on policy development. If the local area suffers from a particular problem that is felt at the local level - extreme congestion, high numbers of pedestrian deaths of the roads, air pollution, erosion of the local landscape – these may become a political priority. High level local political support (or lack of) will determine in part how successful local policies of sustainable development are. In addition to this, in our country council, the two tiered system led to a mix of councillors with very different backgrounds and interests, especially since borough level councillors are more likely to have in-depth knowledge about specific local issues, and are likely to promote issues that will not lose them political popularity. The different electoral cycles in a county and borough council can also be a barrier (window of opportunity lessened).

Our fieldwork indicates that policy tools such as indicators and models can become highly politicised where the notion of 'evidence' is contested. The CC housing development is an example of this; different predictive models concerning the flood risk are being used both to promote, and to oppose the development. Consultants have been brought in by both 'sides' to present evidence, which has lead to very different estimations of both flood risk in the first instance, and acceptable levels of risk in the second. In our Unitary authority, the URC (Urban Regeneration Company) is meant to have a level of autonomy over planning decisions, however, since the leader of the opposition sits on the board decisions have become more politicised. However, in this case the use of consultants and 'objective' experts has helped the decision process (rather than becoming embroiled in it).

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Analysis of key barriers:
- Political aims and ambitions when they are in conflict with policy aims
- Electoral cycles and processes
- Misuse of evidence

Analysis of key facilitators:
- Political support for high profile problems
- De-politicisation of evidence

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## 3.5. Discussion of case study findings

Table 6 (below) outlines the key barriers and facilitators of policy development and delivery recognisable in our case study work to date. These can be related to the physical structure of local authority/PTE departments, and to values, perceptions and norms stemming from acting within these structures (Attributes A and Attributes B; see also FD1 for 'mental processes' in that Report, section 2.5). These compliment the facilitators and inhibitors outlined in Table 4 earlier, but in some instances go beyond these. The most significant findings of our case studies relate to three types of relationship between local authorities, PTEs and other bodies, and also to political issues, as summarised below.

### Established relationships

In cases where there is (or should be) an established relationship because policy responsibilities span across a number of organisations, the main barriers relate to the extent to which organisations work together, rather than whether they do or not in the first place. How such organisations have worked together previously, attitudes towards joint working and physical proximity all play a role in our case study areas.

### Administrative disjointedness

Where there is an administrative disjointedness between different organisations despite a logical connectedness in policy terms - such as the case of our PTE, five local authorities and the Highways Agency. This highlights the importance of different priorities at different levels and how these motivate different organisations to work (or not) with each other.

### Non existent relationships

Where organisations work with sectors that have been out of their terms of reference previously perceptions about remit, different working practices and priorities are all significant issues. The business practices adopted by the regeneration company in our Metropolitan City Council provide an example of overcoming such issues. Our County Council, Metropolitan City Council, and Unitary authority have all entered into partnerships with the private sector, and our PTE has attempted with varying levels of success to work with social service, employment and education departments.

### Politics and political processes

The overarching issue of politics and political processes has been outlined as a significant issue in our case study work. Our findings mirror those discussed above in the background section, although they do go one step further, considering the potential politicisation and de politicisation of evidence.

This section brings our main findings back to our original DISTILLATE project D objectives, which are:

- to understand better the causes of the barriers between LA/PTE offices and external stakeholders and (based upon our forthcoming literature/data review of policy & institutional process) suggest ways of overcoming these;

- to understand better the internal cultural and structural barriers within LA/PTEs and (based upon our forthcoming literature/data review of policy & institutional process) suggest ways of overcoming these; and

- to understand better the barriers between technical expertise and its application in decision making and to suggest ways of overcoming these,

and in the light of the theories introduced in section 3, we shall now discuss the above data from our cases.

However, it must be noted that when we first developed the LFA we imagined the term 'external stakeholders' would refer to bodies and organisations outside the direct remit of the local authority/PTE, and 'internal' would relate to all those working within a local authority/PTE. This implies that external stakeholders are more likely to have different remits, objectives and working practices than those categorised as internal stakeholders. It also implies that the barriers associated with these two different types of stakeholder are likely to be different. Additionally, following the preliminary fieldwork results discussed above, it is clear that the relationship between different departments, sectors and organisations is highly variable and difficult to characterise in such terms. In our Metropolitan City study for example, the working relations between the URC and private sector are perhaps more clearly defined and proficient than those between the city council and other local authority departments, this is similarly the case with our County Council study. With this caveat in mind, this section now explores how our case study findings inform the three objectives from the LFA, and implications for the remainder of the Project D study.

*LFA Objective One: to understand better the causes of the barriers between LA/PTE offices and external stakeholders and (based upon our forthcoming literature/data review of policy & institutional process) suggest ways of overcoming these*

Whilst all four of the themes summarised above inform LFA Objective One, the first and third are of the most relevance.

It seems clear that where there is a history of working with external stakeholders - such as the private sector, governmental bodies, and agencies such as the highways agency – this is likely to facilitate the relationship between LA/PTE officers and external stakeholders. However, this may produce relationships that are difficult to challenge, and may work against the aims of sustainable transport as well as for them (see the discussion of policy networks in earlier sections of this report).

Further, the development of joint working is influenced by the specific bodies and organisations involved, and their perceptions about the benefits of collaboration. Developing relationships between different organisations is costly, and requires input and commitment; our empirical work suggests that different objectives, priorities, and sectoral outlooks can lead to a lack of willpower to invest resources in developing links, and also a lack of commitment in terms of supporting and maintaining links that have been developed. Our fieldwork also suggests that in some instances some bodies are more keen on joint working than others - this has been highlighted in the case of our PTE which has recognised the need to integrate policy with different administrative levels of government, but this recognition is not necessarily reciprocated in borough level departments.

Furthermore, partnerships may be dissuaded by differences (or perceptions of differences) in working patterns, especially when it comes to the private sector. Our metropolitan city case study has demonstrated that the different approach taken by the private sector must be understood in order to develop partnership working. The URC has actually adopted an approach that is inline with private sector needs, and it's separation from the City Council has distanced it from the day to day concerns of those working in policy development and delivery. How successfully this approach is played out, and whether it compromises policy development will be an interesting area for the literature review to investigate.

*To understand better the internal cultural and structural barriers within LA/PTEs and (based upon our forthcoming literature/data review of policy & institutional process) suggest ways of overcoming these*

As described above, the distinction between 'internal' and 'external' stakeholders becomes muddied when related to our empirical findings. Also, a number of the findings can relate to both internal and external stakeholders. However, the themes covered by section one to three of Table 6 are all relevant to this Objective.

The fragmentation of policy responsibilities amongst a number of local government departments has arisen a number of times in our case studies. The case studies have demonstrated that the way in which local government duties are divided amongst different departments and tiers means that if these bodies do not work together, meeting policy aims and objectives can be limited. As alluded to above, different outlooks, priorities, and duties can all colour the extent to which an organisation is prepared to engage in collaborative working in the first instance, and maintain it in the second. The apparent unwillingness of some local government departments to work with the transport team in both our County and PTE example demonstrate this point in action. Given the diminished powers and responsibilities that local government departments suffer from – described earlier in this report – the challenge of working with sectors that do not traditionally have a relationship with each other (such as transport, education, leisure or health) is understandable, and is a problem that can be investigated further in our targeted literature review, particularly in terms of building understanding of mutual benefits of joint working, examples of best practice, recommendations about how to set up partnerships etc. However, problematic relationships between departments that are traditionally linked (such as transport and planning) need more than advice on the benefits of joint working, and ways of overcoming these problems are more likely to be related to working practices (both inflexible factors such as physical location of offices, and flexible factors such as arrangements for meetings, and the level of staff involved), and priorities - both political and departmental, again, these issues can be explored further in the literature review and are closely linked to the outputs of FD1.

Political factors also inform our understanding of LFA Objective 2. Structures of politics and political processes shape and drive policy development, and encourage policy makers to react in certain ways. For example, in both our Metropolitan City and County studies there is a degree of informal interaction to ensure that policies brought to decision makers are approved. In the case of the former study, major decisions are made within a two year window of opportunity as a result of electoral cycles. Whilst the policy makers in our studies have developed methods of side stepping political barriers, a further investigation of political cycles and policy development may be relevant.


*To understand better the barriers between technical expertise and its application in decision making and to suggest ways of overcoming these*

The issues raised by our field work relate to the third objective of the LFA largely in terms of the use and misuse of technical evidence covered by the fourth theme of table 6.

In our case study findings so far the disciplinary backgrounds, levels of expertise, and priorities of different local government departments may complicate the use of technical expertise. Indeed, the example of the use of differing evidence in our County case study to back two opposing view points demonstrates the politicisation of technical expertise. On the other hand, the case of our Metropolitan City demonstrates the opposite effect, through the use of an 'objective' transport consultant who was used to depoliticise expertise.

However, the most significant part of the empirical work is yet to come, as links to DISTILLATE project G are more fully explored over the forthcoming year.

| Area | Key barriers | Key facilitators |
|---|---|---|
| 1) Division of various policy responsibilities across a number of different public sector organisations | Lack of willpower, coordination, and communication<br><br><br><br>Shakeups of successful working practices | Physical proximity is a positive providing roles and responsibilities are clearly demarcated<br><br>History of collaborative working |
| 2) Working with sectors spanning beyond immediate policy making circles, but where there are clear links | A wide range of priorities which aren't necessarily compatible<br><br>A lack of clearly defined relationships between organisations<br><br>One way relationships i.e. where one organisation is more keen on joint working than the other<br><br>Different priorities at different levels | Clearly defined relationships and reasons for collaborative working :<br><br>Similar goals<br>Two way needs<br>Financial gain or added value<br>Mandatory requirements<br>Clear links between policies regardless of departmental divisions<br><br>Clearly defined mandatory requirements<br>Champions at all levels<br>Consistency of staff/personnel |
| 3) Extending joint working beyond traditional sectors | Perceptions about disciplinary boundaries remit, and working practices<br><br>Concerns about losing control over discrete policy areas<br><br>Contacts and existing working relationships maybe limited | Communication & good relationships<br><br><br>Ability to see 'bigger picture' rather than sectoral interests<br><br><br>Business type approach rather than a bureaucratic one may help dealing with the private sector |
| 4) Political factors | Political aims and ambitions in conflict with policy aims<br><br>Electoral cycles and processes<br><br>Misuse of evidence | Political support for high profile problems<br><br>De-politicisation of evidence |

We believe that our cases have shown us how the development and use of institutional and organisational regimes have in certain crucial areas of the UK led to improved effectiveness in the organisational delivery of sustainable transport solutions. This process has often been driven by key actors, but the fact that the processes that they have driven are now successfully institutionalised suggests that it is (or should be) possible to develop institutional solutions to the problems of the barriers between local authorities and external stakeholders, internal cultural and structural barriers within local authorities, and barriers to using evidence based approaches. Table 6 shows us that solutions are possible and the tables of key barriers, drivers and facilitators in the data support this assertion.

However, the wider structures are important and must be considered: as is pointed out in the literature section of the introduction, public contract politics helps to move the risk from planner or officer to elected member but this in turn makes member even more risk-averse and constrains possible courses

of action available to officers and planners and emphasise the need to engage politicians ands 'the public'. Our next stage will be to look wider afield at how other institutions have overcome similar barriers. By this process we will be able to identify best practice in the institutionalization of good practice and, further, using our selected authorities we can test the transferability of 'solutions' into the UK transport context. We will explore knowledge transfer with particular reference to social learning and its application in other areas to glean what we can use in the UK local transport and land-use arena.

# 4. Conclusion

The aims of Project D fieldwork are largely to understanding policy processes better, mapping the complexity of decision making & implementation (with other projects) in order to investigate successes in local policies and see if these successes in effective collaboration across institutions and organisations responsible for transport strategy development can be replicated. In order to understand the processes by which these successes have been delivered we need to understand the structure(s) that constrains it and we have explored this from a social science perspective in the Introduction. The remainder of Sections 2 and 3 are in essence attempting to reveal the structural facilitators of good practice. Our case studies were chosen to make use of the comparative method: thus we looked at two PTEs in operation, a Unitary and a Metropolitan City Council were roughly comparable and on certain levels, particularly with respect to the development of LTP2, our County Council was analogous to one of our PTEs. Further, we looked at two areas in which (re)development was of paramount importance and two areas where development was countered by a strong conservative (with a small 'c') ethos.

What we have found so far suggests that a certain level of replicatability may be possible but the ad-hoc nature and individuality of so many local governance organisational structures militates against a simple transfer of ideas or practice. In addition, our next stage in Project D is to perform a targeted literature and data search to look for examples from outside the transport sector and UK contexts. This will allow us further refine and add to this list of suggested institutional and organisational 'improvements'. We can recommend ways of improving the communications and structured interactions between groups that have been shown in some case studies to benefit organisations that are working together. We can do this from our cases (PTE, Metropolitan and Unitary authority cases especially) as well as from the literature. Infrastructural issues can exacerbate disciplinary siloing in that transport people (who may or may not be working in the LA) may or may not have disciplinary transport colleagues to input ideas, or conversely they may or may not have colleagues from other disciplines to input wider perspectives. This can be a problem where transport planners in particular are physically removed from non-transport experts. However, we are not recommending a wholesale move to centralised offices as we have shown that this can throw up as many structural problems as it solves. What is important is that the structure is acknowledged and that it is worked within.

As well as the findings presented in Table 6 there are some generalisable issues. The culture of the workplace – and the workforce – is important in that people who work for a council with a more rounded remit – including some opportunities for working in and with different service areas – can be wider that those working for a public transport organisation. However, this is not necessarily that case, our PTE has shown that a transport organisation can successfully adopt a wide remit for itself: but this wider remit may not always permeate that organisation's dealings with outside organisations. The limitation is certainly true for organisational and staff identities and organisational identity is important particularly as it relates to practical considerations.

In our CC case study area, the institutional networks are probably strongest at the sub-regional level. The CC also works well with the Regional Assembly. The CC successfully engages down to the Boroughs when working on housing issues and up to the Regional Assembly and Regional Government Offices when discussing transport priorities. Although there is a strategic alignment on these issues at the regional level this is much less evident at the level of practical policy intervention. There are also significant boundary issues for the Council with the neighbouring economically buoyant city region. This is all born out in out PTE case study where the same issues of cross-level working are to be found and the PTE works well 'up' to the regional and national levels and equally well down to the authority and even community level. What is evident, however, is a siloing of this good practice! The people who engage well at the community level and who have overcome structural barriers to delivery at that level may not necessarily be the people who engage well at the

borough, regional or national level so there is a level of 'joined up governance' yet to come within the organisations.

Other 'barriers' to good organisational good practice are related to the above point and include the use (or not) of evidence based approaches. In particular there is a missing 'joined-upness' between a target-based approach as set out within LTP2 and an appraisal-based approach as inspired by NATA (NB not necessarily formal NATA appraisal but any NATA-influenced decision making). The issues here are more generic and we can focus upon key individuals within key institutions and organisations in the policy arena to see how they have overcome this barrier in particular. In this way we focus upon the actual drivers of decision making & implementation – the individual actors – but we do this within an understanding of the structures within which they operate.

Traditionally economic interests are dominant at the local level, and it can be difficult to overcome these. Above we have shown how economic development is often perceived as pre-eminent and environmental concerns, sustainable development, and, indeed, transport concerns play a peripheral part. It is important to remember that, within the perspective of the wider institutional structure, transport is seen as a small player. Thus, while for the transport planners and professionals, transport is the process, for health or educational professionals – or, indeed for economic development planner, transport is not the process but only a tool which is used by them as a means to an end.

Following these two reports (FD1 and FD2), the next stage in Project D is to use the analytical structure outlined in this and the other (FD1) document, and the output of the ongoing information & literature review, to suggest where we can best target our efforts to produce a step change in actors' behaviour. In particular, we will be using theories of policy change to show how understanding the networks within which actors work and how those actors perceive their role within the network is crucial. Our working assumption is that we need to create the social learning necessary to allow grounded, evidence-based knowledge to permeate the wider planning community. We will also focus upon good practice from other areas in the use of targets, indicators, and appraisal. This will include a review of academic and practitioner publications and data in these fields. The findings from these reviews will be shared with our case study collaborators, written up practitioner guides and in academic papers.

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# Glossary

**Agency** – agency is the ability of an individual actor to act. S/he does this within the structure. Agency can also be used to describe the process by which culture influences action.

**Bounded Rationality** – the ability of individuals to operate as rational actors is limited or bounded by the system (structure) within which they are operating

**Culture** – what's in people's heads. Their aspirations, goals, knowledge, understanding

**Goals –** anything which actors try to attain through activity.

**Grounded theory, grounded approach** – Grounded theory is a process whereby data is gathered and theories are extrapolated in a series of iterative processes. The data must be qualitative and high quality so as to inform high quality analysis. The point of a grounded approach is deliver good data-concepts links.

**Norms –** rules which guide actors' behaviour.

**Structure (1):** infrastructure – used here to mean anything which has a physical reality.

**Structure (2): social structure** – the phenomenon of culture that can be observed.

# Acronyms

CC………………………………………………………………….County Council
DCLG…...…………………………….Department for Communities and Local Government
LA……………………………………………………………….....Local Authority
LAA………………………………………………………...Local Area Agreement
LDF…………………………………………………….Local Development Framework
LFA…………………………………………………….Logical Framework Analysis
LSP…………………………………………………….Local Strategic Partnership
LTP…...................................................................................Local Transport Plan
LTS…………………………………………………..Local Transportation Service
NATA……………………………………………...……New Approach To Appraisal
NGO…………………………………………………..Non Governmental Organisation
ODPM……………………………….…………Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
PPP…………………………………………………...Public Private Partnership
PTE………………………………………………...Passenger Transport Executive
RA………………………………………………………...Regional Assembly
RDA……………………………………………….Regional Development Agency
RSS……………………………………………………...Regional Spatial Strategy
HA……………………………………………………………….Health Authority
RES……………………………………………….…Regional Economic Strategy
DfT…………………………………………………………..Department for Transport
SRA…………………………………………………….Strategic Rail Authority
SEA……………………………………………….Strategic Environmental Assessment